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court, on habeas corpus, in effect gave petitioner a declaratory judgment
that his appeal was pending.
L. E. M.
V.M.
TAXATION-BEQUEST TO CHARITABLE on RELIGIOUS CORPORATION-EFFECT
or POLITICAL AcTmvr-[Federal].-Testatrix died in 1933 leaving a be-
quest to the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals of the
Methodist Episcopal Church. Petitioner, executor of deceased, contended
that this bequest came within the provisions of the Revenue Act of 19261
which authorized the deduction from the value of the gross estate of the
amount of all bequests "to or for the use of any corporation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or edu-
cational purposes." The certificate of incorporation of the beneficiary stated
that its objects were to promote temperance by every legitimate means
and to aid such causes as would advance public welfare.2 The beneficiary
having no by-laws of its own, operated under the constitution of the church
which expressly stated among its purposes the securing of legislation
throughout the world to suppress traffic in liquor and narcotics3 In prac-
tice, the Board of Temperance participated in political activity and pub-
lished propaganda. The Board of Tax Appeals disallowed the deduction
on the ground that the Board of Temperance was not engaged exclusively
in any or all of the purposes enumerated in the statute.' Held: reversed,
for petitioner. The beneficiary was organized exclusively for religious pur-
poses, and its political activity was merely an incidental and natural part
of its attempt to spread its views. One judge dissented. Girard Trust Go. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.5
Two questions are apparent in this case. First, do the purposes of the
beneficiary qualify as one or more of the five kinds listed by the statute?
(2d) 146, cert. den. (1932) 286 U. S. 550; Ex parte Clay (1889) 98 Mo.
578, 11 S. W. 998; Ex parte Mitchell (1891) 104 Mo. 121, 16 S. W. 118;
Finkelnburg and Williams, Missouri Appellate Practice (2d ed. 1906) 244;
25 A. J. 157.
1. Revenue Act 1926, 44 Stat. 9, c. 27, §303 (a) (3), 26 U. S. C. A. Int.
Rev. Acts, p. 234.
2. "To promote the cause of temperance by every legitimate means; to
prevent the improper use of drugs and narcotics; to render aid to such
causes as in the judgment of the board of trustees, tend to advance the
public welfare."
3. Article 478 of the Discipline of 1922 provides: "Section 2. Article 1.
The object of this Board is to promote voluntary total abstinence from all
intoxicants and narcotics, to promote observance and enforcement of all
existing constitutional provisions and statutory enactments that suppress
the liquor traffic and the traffic in narcotic drugs, to promote the speedy
enactment of such legislation throughout the world, and to defend and
maintain established civil and religious liberties."
4. Girard Trust Company and W. Nelson L. West, Executors of the
Estate of Ida Simpson, deceased (1940) 41 B. T. A. 157.
5. (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 108.
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A negative answer to this would preclude the second question. Second, if
the purposes are of a kind listed, do they meet the further statutory re-
quirement of being exclusively those listed? Concerning the first problem,
it may be questioned whether the purposes of the Board of Temperance
were religious, as the majority of the court found.6 However, considering
its articles of incorporation, it would appear that the Board of Temperance
clearly was organized for charitable purposes at least.7 But the question
still is whether its political activities would prevent its being classed as a
charity at all, within the meaning of the statute. The dissenting judge
adopts the English rule,8 which prevails in America only in Massachusetts,9
that a court cannot say that a gift for an otherwise charitable purpose
which involves securing a change in existing laws is a charitable gift,
because the court is not competent to predict whether or not the proposed
change will benefit mankind. The overwhelming weight of authority in
America' o is that the courts in such cases are not called upon to decide
whether or not such proposed legislation or political activity is wise-the
people and their representatives are burdened with that duty-and the fact
that the purpose of a charitable trust may involve advocacy of a change
in the law will not defeat it as a charity." It is submitted that the Amer-
ican view is better. Lawful change of existing laws is part of the essence
of our democratic theory. If, therefore, proper political activity be a legiti-
6. "Whether a given set of dogmas or rules will be dignified with the
name of a 'religion' by a court does not depend upon the name which the
settlor has placed upon his trust. He cannot make a scheme for material
betterment a religion by calling it such. It would seem that the court must
find an element of spiritual improvement in the plan before it can be prop-
erly termed a religion." 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1185.
7. The articles of incorporation state, "to promote the cause of temper-
ance by every legitimate means; to prevent the improper use of drugs and
narcotics; to render aid to such causes as in the judgment of the board of
trustees, tend to advance the public welfare."
"A trust for the promotion of purposes which are of a character suffi-
ciently beneficial to the community as to justify permitting property to be
devoted forever to their accomplishment is charitable." Restatement, Trusts
(1935) §374.
A gift to promote or minimize manufacture, sale or use of intoxicating
liquor is a valid charitable trust. See collection of cases 73 A. L. R. 1361;
8 Scott, Trusts (1939) §374.1; Restatement, Trusts §374(b).
8. 4 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed., 1932) 137; Bowman v. Secular
Society, Ltd. (1917) A. C. 406; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Temper-
ance Council of Christian Churches of England and Wales (1926) 42
T. L. R. 618.
9. Jackson v. Phillips (1867) 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 539 (trust to pro-
mote women's rights held not charitable); Bowditch v. Attorney General
(1922) 241 Mass. 168, 134 N. E. 796, 28 A. L. R. 713 (trust to promote
women's political rights by securing legislation held not charitable).
10. Restatement, Trusts (1935) §374, comments j, k; 3 Scott, Trusts
(1939) §374.4; 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) §378; Bartlett, Chari-
table Trusts to Effect Changes in the Law (1928) 16 Cal. L. Rev. 478;
Comment (1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 139; Comment (1931) 4 So. Cal. L. Rev.
418; Comment (1922) 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 89; Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 951.
11. Taylor v. Hoag et al. (1922) 273 Pa. 194, 116 Ati. 826, 21 A. L. R.
946; commented on in (1922) 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 89.
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mate means, a charitable institution employing such means should not be
disqualified on that basis alone.
Assuming that the political activities of the Board of Temperance would
not prevent its being held a charity, the problem still remains whether
those activities should not prevent its being held exclusively a charity within
the language of the statute. The Board of Tax Appeals, in the light of the
evidence, including the constitution under which the beneficiary operated, 12
felt obliged to hold that its other activities were substantial enough to dis-
qualify it.'3 The Circuit Court of Appeals drew from the same evidence a
contrary conclusion, and reasoned that the final natural step in the bene-
ficiary's religious and charitable activities was "to secure the sanction of
organized society for or against certain outward practices thought to be
essential.""4 What constitutes a "substantial" part of a charity's activities
cannot be measured with scientific accuracy. The decision must necessarily
be the product of various factors bearing on each particular situation; in
the instant case, the fact that the Board of Temperance was affiliated with
a recognized church doubtless influenced the court's decision. Viewing all
the political activities15 in which the Board of Temperance engaged, they
appear to be sufficient to constitute a "substantial" part of the beneficiary's
operations. In the light of other decisions,1 6 it is submitted that the con-
clusions of the Board of Tax Appeals ought to have been affirmed.
Had the operative facts of this case occurred under the 1934 amendment.
to the Revenue Act of 1926, which disqualified a corporation organized for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes if a sub-
stantial part of its activities was carrying on propaganda or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation, this court would probably have decided
12. See note 3, supra.
13. The evidence showed that the Board of Temperance issued a monthly
publication called "The Voice" and another monthly called "The Clip"; that
in "The Voice" readers were urged to write letters to their Congressmen
concerning action on various bills before Congress dealing with the liquor
situation; that Churches were urged to pass resolutions and send them to
Congressmen; that the Board actively participated in the presidential cam-
paign of 1928 urging the election of certain candidates; that the Board was
represented in House hearings on legislation relative to the sale of beer and
had opposed the "wet" program, etc. For a description of the Board's
activities see Girard Trust Co. and W. Nelson L. West, Executors of the
Estate of Ida Simpson, deceased (1940) 41 B. T. A. 157.
14. Girard Trust Co. v. C. I. R. (1941) 122 F. (2d) 108, 110.
15. See note 12, supra.
16. The following cases involved the deduction of gifts for income tax
purposes: appeal of Herbert F. Fales (1927) 9 B. T. A. 828; Joseph M.
Price (1928) 12 B. T. A. 1186; Slee v. C. I. R. (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 42 F.(2d) 184, 72 A. L. R. 400; Henrietta T. Noyes (1934) 31 B. T. A. 121.
The following cases involved the deduction of certain legacies in computing
the estate tax; Leubuscher v. C. I. R. (C. C. A. 2, 1932) 54 F. (2d) 998;
Vanderbilt v. C. I. R. (C. C. A. 1, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 360.
17. Amended by the addition of the phrase "and no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation." 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Acts p. 235, 48 Stat.
755, c. 277, §406.
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the same way. In the first place, this amendment is merely a legislative
enactment of already existing administrative and judicial policy.18 Before
the amendment, courts reasoned that the purposes were not "exclusively"
those listed in the statute, if a "substantial" part of the activities was
political.19 In the second place, this amendment may possibly destroy the
dissent's legal theory, because by implication Congress has recognized that
a corporation organized for charity may engage in some political activity.
In the third place, although tax exemptions are usually a matter of grace,
and apparently the express terms of revenue laws should be enforced, tax
exemptions relating to charitable institutions are in a different category.
Because bequests for purposes which benefit mankind are an aid to good
government and, through private funds, relieve the public of a possible
burden, the exemption of such bequests is less a matter of grace and more
a matter of public policy; therefore, such exemptions are liberally con-
strued.20 Assuming that this court would reach the same decision under
the amended statute as it did in the instant case, these three points would
apparently support the court's decision. But, it is submitted that, viewing
the evidence2 l of the Board of Temperance's political activities and giving
reasonable content to the word "substantial," the court should not exempt
the bequest under either the amended statute or the unamended statute.
F. L. N.
TORTS--FRAUD--DUTY TO ExERCIsE DILIGENCE IN DISCOVERING-SECURI-
TiEs AND EXCHANGE AT-[Federal].-Plaintiff, in November, 1936, on the
strength of defendant broker's tip that Schenley's stock would advance 15
points within a reasonable time owing to buying operations of a syndicate
of New York bankers, purchased 100 shares; despite a prompt and gradual
fall in price, the plaintiff continued to hold the stock until the broker's
misrepresentation was explained to him 15 months later, in February, 1938.
He thereupon brought this action under Section 9 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 which imposes a liability upon brokers for mitrepre-
sentations concerning the price of stock. Held: Since plaintiff had not
"entered a false market or paid a false price to enter a genuine market"
the action was improperly brought under Section 9 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934; 1 obiter, though plaintiff might have had an action
under Section 12 of the 1933 Securities and Exchange Act,2 the statute
of limitations in the act would have run against him. Rosenberg v. Hano.8
18. Girard Trust Co. and W. Nelson L. West, Executors of the Estate
of Ida Simpson, deceased (1940) 41 B. T. A. 157, 161.
19. See note 16, supra.
20. Helvering v. Bliss (1934) 293 U. S. 144, 55 S. Ct. 17, 79 L. Ed.
246, 95 A. L. R. 207; Cochran v. C. I. R. (C. C. A. 4, 1935) 78 F. (2d)
176.
21. See note 13, supra.
1. (1934) 48 Stat. 881 c. 404, 15 U. S. C. A. §78.
2. (1933) 48 Stat. 84, c. 38, §12, 15 U. S. C. A. §77e.
3. (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 818.
19421
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/12
